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Unlike most countries, China regulates internal migration. Public benefits, access to good 
quality housing, schools, health care, and attractive employment opportunities are available 
only to those who have local registration (Hukou). Coincident with the deepening of economic 
reforms, Hukou has gradually been relaxed since the 1980s, helping to explain an 
extraordinary surge of migration within China. In this study of interprovincial Chinese 
migration, we address two questions. First, what is a sensible way of incorporating Hukou 
into theoretical and empirical models of internal migration? Second, to what extent has 
Hukou influenced the scale and structure of migration? We incorporate two alternative 
measures of Hukou into a modified gravity model – the unregistered migrant’s: (i) perceived 
probability of securing Hukou; and (ii) perceived probability of securing employment 
opportunities available only to those with Hukou. In contrast to previous studies, our model 
includes a much wider variety of control especially important for the Chinese case. Analyzing 
the relationship between Hukou and migration using census data for 1985-90, 1995-2000 
and 2000-05, we find that migration is very sensitive to Hukou, with the greatest sensitivity 
occurring during the middle period. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
     In most countries, internal migration is unregulated. That is not the case in China, 
which restricts migration through its “Household Registration System,” also called 
“Hukou.” Instituted in 1958, Hukou requires every citizen seeking a change in residence 
to obtain permission from the public security bureau. If one wants to move from a rural to 
urban area, for example, he (or she) must convert his (or her) local registration status 
from “agricultural” to “non-agricultural,” an approval that is usually very difficult.
1  
Likewise, if one wants to move from a small city to a large city, it is also very difficult. 
Being registered in a large city can bring substantial benefits, e.g. access to permanent 
jobs (including jobs in the state sector), housing, food, public schooling and health care.
2 
Hukou is effectively an internal passport system that makes the process of moving 
between or within provinces analogous to the process of moving between countries. For 
researchers interested in the study of how restrictions affect the scale and structure of 
migration, China is thus a tremendously valuable natural experiment.   
     We contend that the Chinese case is important for migration researchers worldwide 
for two reasons. First, consider the fact that despite the high costs of changing one’s local 
registration, there continues to be a very high level of undocumented migration in China. 
                                                 
1 Historically, it has been very difficult to change one’s local citizenship in China and even today, there are 
considerable barriers to obtaining local registration in an urban area. One way of surmounting these barriers 
is through education. If a person is able to gain admission to college and complete his degree, then there is 
a strong chance of being hired into an urban job with local registration. The government has sometimes 
permitted factories in urban areas to hire permanent workers from rural areas, permitted family members in 
rural areas to join other members in cities, or permitted migration from rural areas to nearby small cities. 
Other ways of gaining urban Hukou include military recruitment or having membership in communes 
whose land is requisitioned for urban purposes. In addition to the costs of overcoming barriers to access, 
conversion to urban Hukou imposes high opportunity costs. For example, permanently leaving one’s 
village forces a migrant to abandon claims to ownership of land without compensation, land that may have 
been in the family for decades, as well as to profits of local rural industries. 
2 Until the early 1990s, urban Hukou also entitled a person to “grain rations” – rations of necessities such as 
grain products and kerosene.   4
There is a huge “floating population” comprising persons with no local household 
registration who have concentrated primarily in large coastal cities.
3 The floating 
population has grown because as China’s transition to a market-based economy has 
intensified, regional income differences (which have favored Eastern coastal cities) have 
widened. Analogous to the large population of undocumented U.S. immigrants from 
Mexico and Central America, China’s floating population is testimony to the power of 
spatial differences in income as a motive for migration.
4 It follows that despite the history 
of central planning in China, traditional Western models of migration, which emphasize 
the influence of spatial differences in labor markets, should be quite applicable to the 
Chinese case.  
     A second reason is that Hukou has undergone an incremental dismantling over the last 
three decades. The deregulation of migration in China may be broken down into three 
periods – the 1980s, 1990s and post-2000 period. Up to the late 1980s, anyone wishing to 
travel within China had to show an official “permission” letter from his/her local 
government. Beginning in the late 1980s, identity cards replaced permission letters, 
making it much easier to travel. During the early 1990s, grain rationing coupons were 
abolished. These coupons had been the means by which people obtained food rations and 
                                                 
3 The floating population comprises the bulk of the extraordinary surge in internal migration that has taken 
place since the 1980s. Based on the 1% population sample survey of 1987, for example, it is estimated that 
over 30 million Chinese relocated either within or between provinces during 1982-87. Using data from the 
2000 Chinese Census, researchers have estimated that intra- and interprovincial migration during 1995-
2000 totaled over 121 million persons. According to the 2005 Census, the level of migration during 2000-
05 is estimated to have risen even further, to nearly 195 million persons. Much of the surge since the mid 
1990s has involved rural residents moving to urban areas without obtaining local registration, particularly 
the metropolitan coastal cities and Beijing. See Seeborg, Jun and Zhu (2000) and Goodkind and West 
(2002) for a discussion of some of the most important reasons for the emergence of the floating population. 
In addition, the government’s Xibu Da Kaifa (“Go West”) policy, enacted in 1999, which encouraged 
Westward migration, has been a recent contribution to China’s migration surge.  
4 For a more detailed history and explanation of the Hukou system, see Chan (1994), Chan and Zhang 
(1999), Cheng and Selden (1994), Day and Xia (1994), Goldstein (1990), Goldstein and Goldstein (1990), 
Wang (1997), Davin (1999), and Liang (2001)   5
they could only be used in the place of residence. In 2001, residency in small towns and 
townships was opened to all rural workers who were legally employed and had a place to 
live. At roughly the same time, medium-sized cities and some provincial capitals 
eliminated ceilings on the number of rural workers who could apply for permanent 
residence status. Some very large cities such as Shanghai and Beijing concurrently eased 
restrictions on the in-migration of rural workers.
5 Since census data on migration flows 
are available going back to the mid-1980s,
6 a test of the effects of deregulation on 
migration is quite feasible because one can exploit the variation in Hukou restrictions 
across all three periods. Since the migration research community still knows very little 
about how exactly changes in restrictions influence migration behavior, the Chinese test 
case could provide significantly valuable information. 
          Thanks largely to the 1990, 2000 and 2005 Chinese censuses and the 
intensification of Western style market reforms, researchers can now study migration 
patterns in China using Western style models. A small, mostly empirical, literature on the 
                                                 
5 Coincident with the easing of Hukou restrictions was the introduction of various market-oriented reforms. 
The first reform was the decollectivization of agriculture (also known as the inception of the household 
responsibility system) in rural areas. The most important aspect of this reform is that it freed workers to 
choose how they wanted to allocate their labor supplies. This encouraged many workers to leave the 
agricultural sector and seek employment in other sectors, most notably enterprises in urban areas. The 
second consisted of a set of market-oriented reforms in the urban areas during the late 1980s. The 
government, in an effort to attract foreign direct investment, created favorable provisions, e.g. tax 
concessions and attractive terms for leasing land, to many coastal cities so they could establish economic 
development areas and high technology development zones. In the 1990s, the government gave special tax 
and regulatory treatment to certain areas (called “special economic zones”), which generated large amounts 
of FDI in those areas. These economic reforms had the effect of creating large real income differentials 
between the Eastern provinces and the rest of China, encouraging Eastward migration. These reforms very 
likely helped to contribute to the rural-to-urban migration surge beginning in the 1980s.  Other  reasons 
include global prosperity, which helped fuel tremendous growth in China’s export markets, the growth of 
migrant networks, and cultural changes making migration more acceptable and appealing.   
6 The first national survey that included questions about migration was the 1987 1% population survey and 
1990 was the first year in which the government collected data on migration in the population census. The 
1990 census asked questions about both inter- and intra-provincial migration for the period 1985-90 and the 
2000 (2005) census included questions about migration during 1995-2000 (2000-05). There have also been 
a number of household surveys in very specific areas of the country, which have included questions about 
migration.    6
determinants of internal migration in China has emerged. Its focus has been to examine 
the extent to which migration flows are driven by regional differences in labor markets.
7 
While most researchers have generally acknowledged the important role of the Hukou 
system in Chinese migration patterns, no study has attempted to estimate the effects of 
Hukou on the scale and structure of migration.
8 While there have been various 
applications of the modified gravity model to studying the determinants of migration 
flows in China, no study has developed a measure of Hukou and estimated a migration 
model which includes such a measure.
9  
     The study coming closest to examining the effects of Hukou on migration is Poncet 
(2006). Poncet argued that as deregulation intensified, migration should have become 
more responsive to economic factors. She estimated a modified gravity model for the 
1985-90 and 1990-95 periods, finding that intra- and interprovincial migration rates were 
                                                 
7 The literature can be conveniently divided into studies utilizing micro-data obtained from special 
household surveys (see, for example, Liang (2001), Liang and White (1996,1997), Zhao (1997,1999a, 
1999b, 2002, 2003) and a few studies utilizing province-level aggregate data provided by the central 
government (see, for example, Fan (2005), Lin, Wang and Zhao (2004), Poncet (2006) and Bao, Hou and 
Shi (2006)). We should also point out that in 2002, an entire issue of the journal Urban Studies was devoted 
to empirical papers on China’s growing migration and urbanization. We particularly wish to highlight the 
studies of Chen and Coulson (2002) on the determinants of urban migration, Liang, Chen and Gu (2002) on 
the effects of rural industrialization on internal migration, Li and Zahniser (2002) on the determinants of 
temporary rural-to-urban immigration, and the Goodkind and West (2002) study on the floating population.  
8 We should point out that several relatively recent studies examine other effects of Hukou. Au and 
Henderson (2006) develop a theoretical model and test to demonstrate that Hukou has led to undersized 
cities (they call this “insufficient agglomeration”) and losses in GDP. Whalley and Zhang (2004) use a 
simulation model to show that in the absence of restrictions on migration, interregional income inequality 
in China would have been substantially smaller. There is also a study by Wu and Treiman (2004), which 
seeks to identify those factors which are most important in influencing the odds of converting from rural to 
urban registration. They find that education and membership in the Chinese Communist Party are the most 
important sources of influence. 
9 Economists studying migration have generally paid very little attention to the modeling of and testing for 
the effects of restrictions on migration propensities. Because most countries don’t have restrictions on 
within-country mobility and most internal migration studies have been on those countries, researchers have 
seen no need to modify their models to account for restrictions. It is surprising, though, that the literature on 
international migration has generally avoided theoretical or empirical analyses of restrictions, especially 
since most countries do have immigration restrictions. The only study of international migration we are 
aware of where a theoretical migration model includes restrictions and where the effects of restrictions on 
migration rates are estimated is Clark, Hatton and William’s (2007) study of U.S. immigration. For a very 
recent appraisal of the status of theoretical and empirical work on the determinants of migration, see 
Chapters 2 and 3 in Bodvarsson and Van den Berg (2009).      7
indeed more responsive to spatial income and unemployment rate differences in the later 
period. However, Poncet’s theoretical and empirical models actually did not include a 
Hukou variable, nor did her data set include a measure of the intensity of Hukou 
restrictions. Furthermore, Poncet’s coefficient estimates are likely to suffer from omitted 
variables bias because her regression equations lacked a number of important controls. 
These include migrant networks, foreign and domestic investments, industry mix, 
demographic characteristics, climate, and educational attainment. We should emphasize, 
though, that lack of adequate controls is a problem with most other studies of Chinese 
migration. 
            The goal of this study is twofold. First, we seek to estimate the strength of the 
Hukou system’s influence on the scale of migration in China. We accomplish this by 
developing several alternative measures of Hukou restrictions and incorporating them 
into a modified gravity model of migration. Using data from the Chinese censuses and 
other sources, we test this model on the 1985-90, 1995-2000 and 2000-05 migration 
periods. We perform panel estimation to ascertain the extent to which the sensitivity of 
migration to Hukou has changed over time. Such an analysis helps us better understand 
how the structure of migration has changed as deregulation of migration and other market 
reforms have deepened. Second, we test our hypotheses using a much more 
comprehensive model of migration than will be found in earlier studies. The Chinese test 
case is unique because it involves an economy in transition from central planning to a 
market-based system, where there have been large infusions of FDI and domestic fixed 
asset investments, considerable social and cultural changes, and tremendous growth in 
communications and transportation infrastructure. China has also experienced very large   8
growth in migrant networks, particularly in urban areas. Earlier studies have not 
adequately included controls for all these factors. Consequently, we believe our test 
provides the most complete and accurate picture to date of the scale and structure of 
migration in China.     
     The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Below we present a theoretical 
model of interprovincial migration flows, which includes parameters describing 
restrictions on internal migration, followed by empirical specifications that include 
Hukou measures. We then describe our data set, followed by a presentation of the 
empirical results. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of our 
findings for Western research on migration. 
      
II.  A THEORETICAL MODEL OF MIGRATION 
     Our theoretical model of internal migration incorporates elements of models due to 
Poncet (2006), Crozet (2004) and Tabuchi and Thisse (2002). For simplicity, we assume 
just one potential destination. Worker k from province j needs to decide whether to 
relocate to province i or stay home. Her objective is to choose the location for which the 
perceived quality of life, adjusting for all relocation costs, is higher. The perceived 
quality of life in a province is assumed to depend upon earnings opportunities available to 
the worker, the probability of finding a job, and the availability of various amenities and 
non-tradeable goods. Amenities and non-tradeable goods may include climate, the 
availability of ethnic goods and services, the quality of schools and public services, etc. 
Furthermore, the perceived quality of life will depend upon the size and proximity of the 
migrant’s community of family and friends from the home province.     9
     The migration decision will also depend upon migration costs, which are assumed to 
vary directly with distance. In the more general case where there are R destination 
provinces (including j), the migrant’s objective function is 
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where πi is the probability of securing employment in province i, Yi is real income in i, dij 
is the geographic distance between home and host provinces, and 
k
i η is a stochastic term 
capturing all the other factors influencing the migrant’s perceptions of the quality of life 
available in province i. Migration costs will rise proportionately with distance because as 
distance rises, typically the physical costs of moving, the costs of acquiring information 
about labor market opportunities in the province, and the psychic costs of migration will 
be higher. In our simplified (one-destination case), though, the decision boils down to 
comparing the two equations below and choosing the option associated with the higher-
value equation: 
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Since there are no migration costs associated with the “stay home” option (equation (3)), 
then real income, the probability of securing employment and/or the migrant’s 
perceptions of provincial characteristics in i, must be higher to overcome any explicit or 
implicit costs of moving there.  
     The migrant’s comparison of the values of equations (2) and (3) is equivalent to her 




i Φ − Φ  , and choosing to relocate   10
only if those net benefits are positive. Taking the difference between equations (2) and 
(3) and then taking logs, the expected net benefits to migration are 
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Equation (4) implies that the likelihood of migration will be higher the higher are 
expected relative income and the relative probability of securing employment in i, the 
higher is the perceived relative favorability of other characteristics of i, and the lower is 
distance. These are standard predictions implied by the economic theory of internal 
migration due originally to Sjaastad (1962) and Greenwood (1969). 
     In the home province, where the prospective migrant is assumed to have local Hukou, 
the probability of securing employment depends upon general labor market conditions, 
which are reflected in the provincial unemployment rate. Specifically, we posit that 
 πj = g(uj), where uj is the unemployment rate in the home province. In provinces where 
labor demand is relatively weak, the unemployment rate will be higher and it will be 
more difficult for anyone to find employment. With subscripts as derivatives, this implies 
that g1 < 0.  
     In the destination province, the unregistered migrant can be hampered in finding a 
good job by two factors – general labor market conditions and the lack of household 
registration. Therefore, the probability of securing employment depends upon both the 
unemployment rate and the likelihood of obtaining Hukou: 
(5) πi = f[ui, pr{Hi}] , 
where ui is the unemployment rate in province i and pr{Hi} is the probability of obtaining 
Hukou. It is assumed that f1 < 0 and f2 > 0. The reason for f2 > 0 is that if a person lacks 
local Hukou, she will be shut out of certain parts of the labor market, e.g. jobs in state   11
enterprises and more high-skill and better-paying jobs. Having local Hukou not only 
provides one access to coveted jobs, but access to a greater variety of jobs. Even if the 
migrant doesn’t care about securing Hukou, she may view the probability of securing 
Hukou as an indicator of the openness of the province, e.g. provinces where it is harder to 
obtain local registration could be provinces that generally impose higher barriers to entry 
for outsiders.  It is also possible that there could be an interaction effect between the 
unemployment rate and the likelihood of securing local Hukou (f12 ≠ 0). For example, 
suppose an export boom affecting all industries strengthens labor demand and lowers the 
unemployment rate. While all workers will experience a higher likelihood of securing 
employment, those with local Hukou may experience an even bigger increase in the odds 
of landing a job (f12 < 0) because they have access to a greater variety of job 
opportunities. 
     Incorporating πj = g(uj) and equation (5) into equation (4), the expected net benefits to 
migration are now   








i d Y Y u H u η η ψ π π − + − − + − = Φ − Φ   
Equation (6) implies that the probability of migration is higher: (a) the higher is the 
unemployment rate in the home province; (b) the lower is the unemployment rate in the 
destination province; and (c) the higher is the perceived probability of obtaining local 
Hukou in the destination. In the section below, we work with several empirical 
specifications implied by equation (6). 
 
 
   12
III.  EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
     The theoretical model above implies a double-log empirical specification where the 
dependent variable is the log of the migration rate (ln(Mij)), defined as the number of 
persons moving from province j to province i as a percentage of all persons moving out 
of province j.
10 In using this specification for the case of China, we include explanatory 
variables from an assortment of studies, including Lin, Wang and Zhao (2004), Bao, Hou 
and Shi (2006) and Poncet (2006). However, our empirical model extends previous 
research in several other important ways. First, we add controls for the regulation of 
migration, which is very important for China because of its history of restrictions on 
migration. Second, we add other measures which are important for the study of the 
Chinese test case. Furthermore, in contrast to most previous studies of China, ours is a 
panel study spanning three important periods of migration. 
          We estimate three specifications implied by the theoretical model. The first is a 
panel version of a basic specification due originally to Greenwood (1969, 1997) and 
applied to the Chinese test case by Lin, Wang and Zhao (2004).  This specification is 
described by the following double-log equation for the interprovincial migration rate: 
 
, Province Period ) (                                                                  
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where: 
Yjit = the ratio of destination province to origin province income in period t; 
 
Dij = Geographic distance between provinces; 
 
πit (πjt) = the probability of securing employment in the destination (origin) province in 
period t; 
                                                 
10 This specification, widely used in the literature, is due originally to Greenwood (1969).   13
 
Zxt = other controls for perceived quality of provincial life, in period t; 
 
Periodt = time period during which migration occurred, where there are T periods; 
 
Provincep = origin province fixed effect, where there are Z provinces; 
 
εijt = random error term; 
 
and the α, β, λ, and θ parameters are coefficients to be estimated. We hypothesize that α1  
> 0, α2 < 0, α3 > 0 and α4 < 0.   
     The next two empirical specifications are extensions of equation (7). Where they 
differ is in how Hukou restrictions are measured. Before describing each equation, it is 
important to note that in China unemployment rates are estimated using data only on 
locally registered persons, i.e. members of the “floating population” are not part of the 
sample. Therefore, the official provincial unemployment rate measures unemployment 
risk for a registered person only. Define uit (ujt) as the reported unemployment rate in the 
destination (origin) province. It follows that (1 – uit) are the odds of securing employment 
in the destination province when a person is registered there and (1 – ujt) are the odds of 
securing employment in the origin province. 
     The first equation measures Hukou as the odds of securing local registration in the 
destination:  
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where “Hukpercent” is the probability of securing local Hukou. Given available data, we 
measure Hukpercent as the lagged relative frequency of registered households. It is 
assumed that prospective migrants know the historical relative frequencies of registered 
households in destination provinces and have adaptive expectations about barriers to   14
entry. We hypothesize that α4 > 0, implying that when the likelihood of securing Hukou 
rises, the perceived benefits to migration and the migration rate will rise. The second 
equation measures Hukou as the joint probability of an unregistered migrant securing a 
job and Hukou in the destination. This measure equals one minus the unemployment rate 
in the destination times the historical relative frequency of registered households: 
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While one minus the unemployment rate measures the likelihood of a registered migrant 
securing a job, weighting that likelihood by the likelihood of securing Hukou accounts 
for the fact that unregistered migrants find it more difficult to secure employment in the 
destination than those who are registered, all other things equal. It is hypothesized that α3 
in equation (9) is positive. 
     Another way of looking at the difference between equations (8) and (9) is that in (9), 
Hukou is relevant to the migrant only if it impacts the odds of securing employment in 
the destination. In contrast, equation (8) includes a more expansive measure of Hukou, 
reflecting the notion that the benefit of local Hukou goes beyond getting a good job; 
Being registered means having access to other kinds of benefits in the destination, e.g. 
access to public benefits, better quality housing or job security.  
     The interactions between the time period dummies and the relative frequency of 
registered households ((Periodt)(Ln(Hukpercentit)) describe the time-varying effects of 
Hukou on the incentive to migrate. If the odds of obtaining local Hukou affect the 
incentive to migrate differently for different periods, this will be reflected in positive or 
negative values of the χt coefficients in equations (8) and (9). The Hukou system across   15
China has gradually been relaxed over the last quarter century, with some provinces 
reducing barriers to local registration more than others. Greater deregulation may, for 
example, lower the perceived relevance of securing Hukou to the migration decision and 
cause the migration rate to be less sensitive to the odds of securing Hukou. In that case, λt 
will be negative. On the other hand, if greater ease of transportation and communication 
reduce migration costs and macroeconomic reforms, combined with growing prosperity, 
substantially stimulate migration flows, then having local registration may be more 
important than before. In that case, λt will be positive.       
     The other controls (the x’s) included for each period in the empirical specifications are 
the following (hypothesized signs in parentheses): 
(i)     log size of the migrant community residing in the destination province that   
   previously migrated from the origin province, as a percent of the destination’s       
   population (> 0); 
 
(ii)    log ratio of real FDI per capita in the destination province to real FDI per capita in    
         the origin province (>0); 
 
(iii)   log ratio of real domestic fixed asset investment (FAI) per capita in the destination   
         province to real domestic FAI in the origin province (>0); 
 
(iv)   log percentages of population enrolled in the origin province’s universities (< 0) and    
         the destination province’s universities  (> 0) 
 
(v)    log ratio of the share of manufacturing employment in the destination to the share of   
         manufacturing employment in the origin (> 0) 
 
(vi)   log ratio of the urban share of the destination province’s population to the urban    
         share of the origin province’s population (> 0) 
 
(vii)  log ratio of the destination province’s minority population share to the origin    
         province’s minority population share (> 0 or < 0); 
 
(viii) log ratio of mean yearly temperature in the capital city of the destination province  
         to mean yearly temperature in the capital city of the origin province (> 0); 
 
(ix)   log share of real origin  FAI devoted to transportation infrastructure (< 0);   16
 
(ix)   interaction of the log of the FDI ratio (item (ii) above) and the log of the FAI ratio    
        (> 0 or < 0); 
 
(x)    interaction of the log of real FAI in the origin and real per capita GDP in the origin  
         (> 0); 
 
(xi)   interaction of the log of relative past migration flows (item (i) above) and log of   
         distance  (> 0). 
 
Below are explanations for hypothesized signs on selected items above:  
 
1.  The migration rate is hypothesized to be positively related to both the 
destination/origin real FDI and FAI ratios. Higher investment, such as new 
commercial or residential construction in the destination area, will generate higher 
demand for labor from other provinces, higher wage rates, and thus an increase in 
“demand-pull” migration. Higher investment in the origin province will diminish the 
incentive to migrate due to more attractive labor market opportunities there. An 
interaction term between the real FDI and FAI ratios is included to control for the 
possibility that higher levels of one investment type may influence the marginal effect 
of the other investment type on the migration rate. Foreign firms investing in a 
province tend to compete for the same pool of workers as do domestic firms making 
fixed-asset investments (which tend to be state and collective enterprises). Suppose, 
for example, there is higher FDI in the destination province which results in a greater 
inflow of workers who obtain employment in FDI-financed firms. Now the pool of 
migrants available for jobs in FAI-financed firms will be lower, implying that the 
amount of immigration induced by higher FAI will be lower. In that case, the 
hypothesized coefficient on the interaction term is negative;    17
2.  The ratio of the share of manufacturing employment in the destination province to the 
origin province’s share is included as a control for industrial composition. 
Manufacturing jobs are generally higher-skilled and higher-paying compared to, for 
example, jobs in the agricultural sector. Therefore, provinces with relatively larger 
manufacturing sectors should attract relatively more migrants, all other things equal, 
especially from provinces that have large agricultural sectors; 
3.   The ratio of destination urban population share to origin urban population share 
controls for relative population density in the destination province. Provinces that are 
relatively more urbanized tend to have different amenities, types of employment 
opportunities, standards of living, etc., which could influence the rate of immigration. 
For example, the proportion of skilled positions in more urban provinces is typically 
higher and may encourage more immigration; 
4.   Following Bao, Hou and Shi (2006, pp. 335), we include a control for the relative 
proportion of the destination’s population that is minority.
11 We include this variable 
for several reasons and postulate that its effect on migration could be positive or 
negative. First, this variable may proxy general political conditions in the province, 
e.g. provinces with larger minority population shares may have more political 
divisiveness than other provinces, which may influence immigration rates. Second, as 
Bao, Hou and Shi (2006) point out, provinces with relatively large minority 
population shares tend to lack many basic service industries, hence entrepreneurial 
migrants seeking to start service businesses may find these provinces profitable places 
to establish businesses. On the other hand, professionals seeking salaried positions 
                                                 
11 The proportion of a province’s population that is minority was computed in the following way: 
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may be less interested in migrating to provinces with higher minority shares because 
they may perceive such provinces to have more limited high-skill employment 
opportunities; 
5.   The migration rate is hypothesized to be positively related to the level of educational 
attainment, measured as the proportion of the province enrolled in universities
12 in the 
destination, because a better-educated labor force often means a distribution of higher 
quality employment opportunities. However, using the same type of argument, greater 
educational attainment in the origin is hypothesized to be inversely related to the 
migration rate; 
6.  In a province where the share of real FAI allocated to transportation infrastructure 
rises, e.g. there are greater investments to expand and upgrade railroads, airports and 
highways, the costs of relocating will fall. We would thus expect to see a higher out-
migration rate from the province; 
7.  The interaction between FAI per capita and real GDP per capita in the origin province 
is included to account for the possibility that emigration from poorer provinces in 
response to changes in domestic investment spending may behave differently than 
emigration from richer provinces. An increase in FAI in the origin province would be 
expected to reduce out-migration from that province. In poorer provinces, where state-
sponsored investment spending is usually much lower to begin with, the marginal 
productivity of new investment and the resulting increase in labor demand may be 
much higher. Consequently, the out-migration rate may fall relatively more in poorer 
provinces than in richer provinces, i.e. the higher is GDP per capita in the origin 
                                                 
12 A better measure of educational attainment is the percentage of the population that is college-educated, 
however that sort of data are not available for individual provinces.   19
province, the lower will be the marginal effect of FAI on the rate of migration from 
the province. In this case, the hypothesized sign on the interaction term is negative; 
8.  The interaction between past migration flows and distance incorporates the idea that 
when the destination and origin provinces are far apart, the marginal value of having 
friends and family already in the destination will be very high, hence the marginal 
effect of past migration flows on the incentive to migrate will be very strong. For a 
long distance move, the migrant will likely be much more reliant on a pre-existing 
migrant network for information and assistance with relocation, as well as relief from 
the psychic costs of relocation. In contrast, when the provinces are very close to one 
another, the destination province will be familiar territory and one is likely to be less 
reliant on a pre-existing network. Therefore, we hypothesize a positive sign on this 
interaction. 
 
IV. DISCUSSION OF DATA 
 
      Our data are drawn from two major sources. For the 1985-90 and 1995-2000 periods, 
we expand the data set used by Lin, Wang and Zhao (2004) in their study of 
interprovincial migration.
13 Their data set is expanded because it doesn’t include some 
provincial measures discussed earlier. Data for 2000-05 plus data for these additional 
measures are taken from University of Michigan’s China Data Online website 
(http://www.chinadataonline.org/), where data on that website are extracted from China’s 
National Bureau of Statistics. The entire data set used in this study consists of 2,425 
observations, although 40 observations for which the migration rate was zero were 
                                                 
13 Note that we replaced Lin, Wang and Zhao’s (2004) calculations of the dependent variable with our own 
calculations. The reason is that there are some inaccuracies in the series used by Lin, Wang and Zhao, 
which they acknowledged in communications with us.   20
excluded.  There are 790 observations for the 1985-90 period, 765 for 1995-2000 and 790 
for 2000-05, for a total of 29 provinces.
14 Each of the 29 provinces was a prospective 
destination and a point of origin. A major drawback of the 1985-90 subsample is that 
estimates of the effects of past migration flows on migration rates during that period 
could not be obtained, owing to the absence of data on migrant flows prior to 1985. 
However, one can use data on migration flows going back to 1985 when estimating 
migration rates for 1990 and beyond. Consequently, we produced two sets of estimates: 
(1) estimates for the full panel with no control for past migration; and (2) estimates for a 
smaller panel comprising the later two periods only with a control for past migration 
(1,580 observations). 
          Tables 1 - 3 show summary statistics for all variables used in our regressions for each 
of the three migration periods. Starting from the top of each table, we describe the 
variable, the data source from which the variable is taken, and trends apparent in the data: 
 
(i ) Gross interprovincial migration rate. For the 1985-90, 1995-2000 and 2000-05 periods, 
respectively, migration rates are calculated from samples comprising 1% of the 1990 
population census, 0.95% of the 2000 census,
15 and 1% of the 2005 census. In the 1990 
(2000, 2005) census, respondents were asked to report on migration activities during 
                                                 
14 As with Lin, Wang and Zhao (2004), we exclude Tibet because of missing observations and treat 
Chongqing as part of Sichuan. 
15 As pointed out by Lin, Wang and Zhao (2004), there is a small difference between the 1990 and 2000 
censuses with respect to how migration is defined. If a person is observed to change residence and to 
change their household registration (a situation officially called “Hukou migration”), then this movement is 
officially classified as “migration” in both censuses. If, however, the person is observed to change 
residence without changing registration (“non-Hukou migration”), then the movement is classified as 
“migration” only if the migrant has been away from the place of registration for a minimum period of time. 
In the 2000 census, this period is 6 months, but in the 1990 census it is one year. To account for this change 
in classification between the two periods, the migration numbers in both periods were standardized by 
discounting the 2000 numbers by a small amount, approximately 5%. For further details, see Lin, Wang 
and Zhao (2004, page 593).   21
1985-90 (1995-2000, 2000-05, respectively). Consequently, migration rates during each 
decade were calculated for only the second half of each decade. The mean volume of 
emigration from a province surged from over 355,000 persons during 1985-90 to over 
1,075,000 during 1995-2000 and over 2,200,000 during 2000-05.
16 Note that mean 
provincial population rose by 9.44% between 1990 and 2000 and by 5.86% between 2000 
and 2005. For the first two periods, Sichuan province experienced the highest volume of 
interprovincial emigration (approximately 1,457,000 persons during 1985-90 and 
4,375,000 during 1995-2000), while Ningxia province had the lowest (approximately 
54,500 persons during 1985-90 and 94,750 during 1995-2000). During 1985-90, the 
highest interprovincial migration rate was 79.34% (Guangxi to Guangdong) and the 
lowest was 0.02% (a tie between Jiangxi to Qinghai and Jiangxi to Ningxia). During 
1995-2000, the highest reported migration rate was 87.32% (Guangxi to Guangdong) and 
the lowest was 0.14% (Jiangxi to Qinghai). For 2000-05, the highest in-migration rate 
was experienced by 36.53% (Guangdong) and the lowest was 0.19% (Qinghai); The 
highest out-migration rate was 20.54% (Gansu) and the lowest was 0% (Xinjiang); 
 
(ii) The historical relative frequency of persons with local Hukou. This is the ratio of the 
registered population to total (registered + unregistered) population at year’s end. For the 
1985-90 (1995-2000, 2000-05) period, we use the mean annual proportion of persons 
with Hukou during 1980-84 (1990-94, 1995-99, respectively). There are two reasons for 
used the lagged proportion of persons with Hukou. First, this measure is consistent with 
its theoretical counterpart, the lagged relative frequency of persons with Hukou. Second, 
                                                 
16 There are likely to be discrepancies in the calculations of these numbers between decades, for the 
reasons discussed in the preceding footnote. 
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there is very likely to be two-way causality between the migration rate and the 
contemporaneous proportion of registered persons in the destination. By using the lagged 
proportion of persons with Hukou we avoid potential problems with simultaneous 
equations bias.  
           Tables 1-3 indicate some very interesting patterns over time with respect to the 
proportion of registered persons in each province. First, note that despite Hukou 
undergoing gradual relaxation, the proportion of persons with local Hukou fell from an 
average of approximately 98% during the early 1980s to an average of approximately 
88.5% during the late 1990s. This is probably because the floating population grew faster 
than the number of registered households. Second, note that the variance of the 
proportion of persons with Hukou across the provinces rose appreciably over these three 
decades. The spread between the minimum and maximum percentages during 1980-84 
was 4.79%, but soared to 21.04% during 1990-94 and 28.85% during 1995-99. This 
means that differences across provinces with respect to the ease of obtaining Hukou rose 
significantly. Some provinces, for example, reduced entry barriers substantially, which 
would have greatly increased the incentive to migrate to those particular provinces.      
 
(iii) Past migration flows. This is measured as the estimated persons from the origin province 
that reside in the destination province, as a percentage of the latter’s population. An ideal 
measure of the size of the migrant community is the percentage stock of previous 
migrants residing in the destination province, measured at the time of migration. 
Unfortunately, unlike data sets in the USA and many European countries, a migrant stock 
measure is not available for China. Therefore, we used past flows. In our regression   23
analyses for the 1995-2000 and 2000-05 sub-samples, relative migrant flows during 
1985-95 were used to proxy the relative size of the migrant network during each of these 
two migration periods. For the 1995-2000 period, the proportionate size of the migrant 
community was calculated by the ratio of total flows from origin to destination during 
1985-95 to the destination’s population in 2000; For the 2000-05 period, we used 1985-
95 flows as a percentage of 2005 population. The basic assumption underlying these 
calculations is that the stock of previous migrants is proportional to the size of the 
previous flow of migrants. While not an ideal measure, we are confident that data on 
flows over a longer (10-year) period should be relatively accurate. Using this approach, 
the average size of the migrant community in each province during 1995-2000 and 2000-
05 was approximately 2.5 million persons; 
 
(iv) Real annual FDI and FAI per capita. For each period, we used mean annual real FDI 
(FAI) per capita during 1980-84 when regressing 1985-90 migration flows, 1990-94 
mean annual real FDI (FAI) per capita when regressing 1995-2000 migration flows and 
1995-99 mean real FDI (FAI) per capita when regressing 2000-05 migration flows. We 
lagged investment spending because it typically takes time for migration to respond to 
changes in spending on investment projects. Furthermore, since there is very likely to be 
two-way causality between investment and migration, by regressing migration rates on 
lagged investments we avoid potential problems with simultaneous equations bias. We 
adjusted the investment series for cost of living differences between the two decades, as 
well as across provinces within each decade, using national government measures of 
provincial CPI and calculating both series at 1985 price levels.  For most of the   24
provinces, FDI numbers were available for each year, but for some there were missing 
years. For several provinces, no investment data were available for 1980-84, so we used 
the earliest year available as a proxy for that period. Therefore, our coefficient estimates 
for the early period may be influenced by measurement error in some parts of the 
investment series. Note that the FDI series is in USA dollars, whereas the fixed asset 
investment series is in Chinese Yuan. 
           Comparing Tables 1-3, there was a dramatic increase in FDI, reflecting a surge in 
interest by international investors in the Chinese economy. The areas receiving the 
highest levels of FDI tended to be the main cities in China and those receiving the lowest 
amounts tended to be rural provinces. Tables 1-3 also indicate that China experienced a 
dramatic increase in FAI across decades, reflecting a boom in mostly state-sponsored 
residential and commercial construction. There is great disparity across provinces with 
respect to the level of construction spending, with the largest cities receiving the most 
investment and rural provinces the least; 
 
(v) The share of manufacturing employment. Manufacturing is classified in China as a 
“Secondary” industry in China and construction is one of its components. There is 
considerable variation across the country with respect to the dominance of manufacturing 
in the provincial labor market. For all three periods, Shanghai had the highest share of 
manufacturing employment and Hainan the lowest; 
 
 (vi) The share of the province’s population that is minority. This is the percentage of 
population that is not Han. Because data on Han population shares for 1990 are not   25
available, we used 2000 data to proxy minority population shares for the first two 
migration periods. For the most recent migration period, we used information on Han 
population shares from the 2005 census; 
 
(vii) Mean real per capita income. Due to lack of available data for consecutive years during 
the 1980s and 1990s, income data only for 1989 (1999) were used to measure average 
annual income for the 1985-90 (1995-2000) periods. For the 2000-05 migration period, 
though, we use the average of incomes for each year. All income data are adjusted for 
cost of living differences across provinces and over time using provincial CPI measures;  
 
(viii) Mean level of educational attainment.  Educational attainment was measured as the 
mean annual percentage of the population enrolled in colleges and universities during 
1985-90, 1995-2000, and 2000-05. For all three periods, most people in each province 
were not enrolled in colleges or universities, reflecting substantial barriers to access to 
post-secondary education in China. However, as reforms deepened and barriers to access 
fell, the percentage of the population enrolled at colleges and universities rose at an 
increasing rate, from approximately one-quarter of one percent during 1985-90 to 
approximately one percent during 2000-05. Note also that the variance of mean annual 
enrollment percentages across provinces also rose at an increasing rate. This could have 
contributed to the rising income inequality observed in China.     
 
Data on the remaining variables are from Lin, Wang and Zhao (2004). Please refer to 
their paper for details on data sources and measurement of these variables.   26
 
V.  COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES 
 
           Tables 4 and 5 provide results from OLS estimation of equations (7), (8) and (9). 
Table 4 presents results for the full panel, whereas Table 5 presents results for the smaller 
panel comprising the last two migration periods. The important difference between the 
two tables is that in Table 4, past migration flows (and the interaction between past 
migration flows and distance) are not included as explanatory variables.  
           Our results reveal three broad patterns. First, results in both tables strongly confirm 
the hypothesis that a strengthening (loosening) of Hukou restrictions will deter 
(stimulate) migration. What is particularly surprising is the very high degree of sensitivity 
of migration rates to Hukou restrictions. Second, Table 5 demonstrates that past 
migration flows are one of the strongest determinants of interprovincial migration rates. 
Note that in a comparison of Tables 4 and 5, the omission or addition of past migration 
flows to the regressions will cause some coefficient estimates and goodness of fit to 
change dramatically. This comes as no surprise, for researchers since Sjaastad (1962) and 
Greenwood (1969), as well as sociologists, have argued that migrant networks tend to 
exert strong influences on the scale of migration. Third, our results demonstrate that the 
“basic specification” (equation (7)) used in earlier studies is clearly an incomplete story 
about internal migration in China.  
             We organize the discussion of specific results as follows. We first discuss 
coefficient estimates for Hukou restrictions. We then discuss the influences of past 
migration flows and the other controls for provincial characteristics.  Before discussing 
specific results, though, we must emphasize that interpretation of the numerical   27
coefficients in Tables 4 and 5 requires some care due to the double-log functional form 
for the regression equations and because some of the independent variables are ratios. 
Note that each coefficient is a migration elasticity, which is the estimated percentage 
change in the percentage of persons moving from province j to province i (out of all 
persons moving from j). Furthermore, some coefficients will be estimates of the 
percentage change in the migration rate when there is a one percentage change in a ratio. 
For example, the coefficient on the destination/origin income ratio measures the 
estimated percentage change in the migration rate when relative destination income 
changes by 1%. Note that all estimated equations in both tables include origin province 
fixed effects and time period controls, and are also corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
Finally, as all the tables indicate, data on some percentage variables were multiplied by 
100 to allow for greater ease in interpretation of coefficients. 
 
       The influence of Hukou 
           Regardless of which measure is used, Tables 4 and 5 confirm that Hukou restrictions 
can have a substantial impact on the scale of interprovincial migration. Consider first 
columns II and III in both tables, where Hukou is measured by the lagged relative 
frequency of registered households. While column II in Table 4 indicates a positive but 
insignificant effect of Hukou on the migration rate, once one adds the Hukou x time 
period interactions, Hukou’s effect is very strong and highly significant. Specifically, 
column III predicts that a one-percentage point increase in the perceived probability of 
securing Hukou (suppose the odds rise by one unit from 88.5 to 89.5 percentage points, 
for example) will induce an increase (decrease) in the migration rate of 11.8%. Table 5   28
reveals similar findings. From column II, for example, a one-point increase (decrease) in 
the odds of securing Hukou will induce an increase (decrease) in the migration rate of 
about 8%. Consider now columns IV and V in Tables 4 and 5, where Hukou is measured 
as the joint probability of an unregistered migrant securing a job and Hukou. From Table 
4, when the odds of securing Hukou rise by a percentage point, the migration rate rises 
between 3.53% and 4.73%. From Table 5, a one percentage point increase in the odds of 
an unregistered migrant securing a job and Hukou will induce an increase in the 
migration rate of between 6.5% and 8%. 
          Tables 4 and 5 also reveal that the sensitivity of migration rates to changes in 
migration restrictions can vary substantially across periods. In Table 4, the default period 
is 1995-2000, so the coefficients on the interactions between the period dummies and 
Hukou (rows 3-4, column III) are estimates of the difference between the elasticity of 
migration with respect to the odds of securing Hukou in one period relative to the middle 
period. The migration elasticity is 23.89% lower in 1985-90 than in 1995-2000, but only 
9% lower in 2000-05 than in 1995-2000. The sensitivity of migration rates to Hukou rose 
between the 1980s and 1990s and fell between the 1990s and 2000s, but the fall between 
the later two periods was less. Thus, measured over the three decades, migration on 
balance is more sensitive to Hukou now than back in the 1980s. This suggests that as the 
comprehensive economic reforms deepened and Hukou underwent incremental reform, 
migration become more sensitive to Hukou.  The same pattern emerges in column V, 
rows 6-7. When the narrower measure of Hukou is used, migration is less sensitive to 
Hukou in the early and later periods compared to the middle period, but the diminution in 
sensitivity is much less in the latest period. In Table 5, the default period is 2000-05.   29
According to column III, row 3, the elasticity of migration with respect to the odds of 
securing Hukou was nearly 22% higher in 2000-05 than in 1995-2000. According to 
column V, row 5, the elasticity with respect to the odds of an unregistered migrant 
securing a job and Hukou was approximately 5% higher in 2000-05.  
            Table 6 pulls together the coefficients from Table 4 and shows results of t tests on 
differences in the time period x Hukou interactions across periods. Note that the default 
period is 1995-2000.  The number in the last column to the right in row 3 is the estimated 
difference between: (A) the change in the migration elasticity (with respect to the odds of 
securing Hukou) from 1985-90 to 1995-2000; and (B) the change in that elasticity from 
1995-2000 to 2000-05. While the elasticity was lower in the first and third periods 
compared to the second period, it is lower than the middle period by 14.8% in 2000-05. 
Note that the estimated difference between (i) the 1985-90 and 1995-2000 difference in 
the elasticity; and (ii) the 2000-05 and 1995-2000 difference in the elasticity is significant 
at 1%.  The number in the last column to the right in row 4 shows the same type of 
information for the migration elasticity with respect to the joint odds of an unregistered 
migrant securing a job and local registration. While that elasticity was lower in the first 
and third periods, it was lower by 8% less in the the third period, a result significant at 
1%.   
              The results in Table 6 suggest that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between 
the elasticity of migration with respect to Hukou restrictions and time. Between the 1980s 
and 1990s, migration’s sensitivity to Hukou apparently rose, which we believe is a result 
of the deepening of economic reforms and deregulation of migration. Following the 
arrival of the new millennium, sensitivity fell, perhaps because the above-normal returns   30
to migration had by then dissipated for most prospective migrants.
17 However, the 
sensitivity of migration to Hukou was still higher in the 2000s compared to the 1980s, 
consistent with our general hypothesis that China’s move towards a market-based system 
heightened incentives to migrate. 
 
            The influence of migrant networks 
           Table 5 illustrates the strong and robust effects of migrant networks on the scale of 
interprovincial migration. Across different specifications, the elasticity of migration with 
respect to past migration flows varies between approximately 0.5% and 0.75%. For 
example, according to column V, a one-point increase in past migration flows (as a 
percentage of current population in the destination) is estimated to cause the migration 
rate to rise by approximately 0.75%. Note that we find no evidence of an interaction 
between past migration flows and distance. Of equal importance is what we learn from 
column VI, which indicates the effects on coefficient estimates and goodness of fit when 
past migration flows are omitted from the regression equation. We find that some 
coefficients on remaining variables change dramatically and the adjusted R-squared falls 
from approximately 75% to 60%. These results illustrate that failure to control for 
migrant networks will very likely lead to omitted variables bias. 
 
             The influence of provincial controls not included in previous studies 
           The results in columns II- V in Tables 4 and 5 illustrate that coefficient estimates from 
earlier studies may suffer from omitted variables bias because some important provincial 
controls are excluded.  Turning first to column III in Table 4, we find that the migration 
                                                 
17 We thank T.N. Srinivasan for pointing this out to us.   31
rate is positively related to relative FDI in the destination; A one-percent increase in the 
ratio of destination to origin FDI generates an approximately 0.06% increase in the 
migration rate. While relative FAI appears to have no effect, the migration rate is 
positively related to the interaction of the two investments. The positive interaction term 
implies that an increase in relative FDI boosts the sensitivity of migration to relative FAI. 
Note also the positive and significant interaction between per capita GDP and FAI per 
capita. This implies that in less prosperous provinces, domestically-financed investment 
has a smaller effect on migration than in more prosperous provinces. Column V in Table 
4 shows the same sorts of results. 
           In Table 5, some of our provincial controls exert important effects on the migration 
rate. According to column III, the migration rate is negatively related to the relative 
destination share of manufacturing employment, the relative destination share of minority 
population, the relative amount of fixed investment in the destination, the investment 
interaction and the share of fixed asset investment comprising transportation 
infrastructure in the origin province. As with the full sample, the migration rate and 
relative FDI in the destination are positively related, although the effect is smaller than in 
the full panel. The coefficient for relative fixed asset investment in the destination is 
contrary to what is hypothesized, but note from column VI that when past migration 
flows are omitted, the coefficient on this investment ratio becomes positive and 
significant. We found this to be true for different permutations of the migration equation 
when past migration flows were excluded. Further investigation confirmed the reason for 
the negative coefficients on the FAI term in columns III and V -- unexplained 
multicollinearity between past migration flows and FAI.   32
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
           We view this study as making two important contributions to the literature. First, very 
little is known in the general immigration literature about the effects of immigration 
restrictions on the scale and structure of migration. Due to lack of theoretical work and 
lack of data in many countries, or vast differences in the types and qualities of available 
data across countries, there are no studies addressing questions such as: (i) How elastic 
are migration rates with respect to a change in quantitative restrictions; (ii) Does 
migration become more or less sensitive to restrictions as they ease over time; and (iii) 
Do restrictions influence the effects of other determinants on migration?  In response to 
this void, we have extended the neoclassical model of internal migration to include the 
effects of restrictions. We seized upon a very convenient natural experiment – China – a 
country with an internal passport system that has been undergoing incremental 
deregulation. For a cross-section study of the effects of immigration restrictions, China is 
a beautiful case of “borders within a border,” allowing a researcher to test for the effects 
of restrictions across spatial units without having to use different data sets for different 
countries or having to control for country-specific influences such as type of political 
system, labor market structure, regulations, and educational system. Furthermore, China 
offers the researcher the opportunity to study the effects of restrictions in a transition 
economy, one that has been experiencing dramatic changes in the structure of its markets.  
            What we learn from our examination of the Chinese test case is that migration can be 
significantly responsive to a loosening of restrictions. We find that even a modest 
reduction in restrictions can greatly strengthen the incentive to migrate. We find strong   33
evidence that the sensitivity of migration to Hukou restrictions has on balance risen over 
the last 30 years, with the greatest increase occurring during the 1990s. We also find that 
adding migration restrictions to an empirical specification can influence considerably the 
effects that other determinants of migration have on migration. Therefore, restrictions 
change not only the scale of migration, but its structure. This inspires a question for 
future research: Are these results for post-reform China generalizable to an international 
study?  
           Our second contribution is to further clarify what drives migration in post-reform 
China. We see our study as generating two specific benefits in this regard. First, we show 
that Hukou’s influence can be substantial, implying that if the goal of deregulation is to 
encourage more labor mobility, then further deregulation is clearly warranted. Second, 
the empirical literature on Chinese migration is still very small, comprising studies that 
estimate relatively parsimonious equations of migration rates. Most of these studies lack 
controls for migrant communities in the destination, indicators of a spatial unit’s 
economic and demographic structures, FDI and domestic investments, export market 
dependency, and other influences. We add migrant networks, FDI and domestic fixed 
asset investments, industry and ethnic mix, climate, origin fixed effects, and more, to the 
modified gravity model of Chinese migration. These controls often contribute 
significantly to accounting for migration patterns across spatial units and time, hence 
failure to include them can result in substantial omitted variables bias. Finally, ours is the 
first comprehensive panel study of migration in China.  
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TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics for 1985-90 period   
765 observations 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Migration rate x 100




Mean annual percentage of 
households with Hukou 
status during 1980-84 x 100 
98.40% 1.412% 99.73% 94.94% 
Real Mean Annual FDI Per 
Capita during 1980-84
ii  
$US 1.544  $US 5.947   $US 31.75  $US 0.0038
Real Mean Annual Fixed 
Asset Investment (FAI) Per 
Capita during 1980-84
ii 
163.77 Yuan  132.84 Yuan  518.71 Yuan  40.888 
Yuan 
Percentage of provincial FAI 
attributable to transportation 
infrastructure x 100 
3.67% 1.85% 8.82% 1.07% 
Railway distance between 









Real annual per capita 
income
iii  
510.95 Yuan  183.11 Yuan  1084.5 Yuan  340.53 
Yuan 
Percentage of population 
enrolled in universities  x 
100 
0.2499% 0.2649% 1.3%  0.08% 
Unemployment rate x 100   1.178%  0.705%  4.11%  0.28% 
Manufacturing share of 
employment x 100 
23.44% 12.10% 59.3%  9.47% 
Urban share of population x 
100  
31.03% 16.17% 73.44% 14.87% 
Mean yearly temperature   14.113 C  5.176 C  24.517 C  4.608 C 
Minority population share 12.28%  16.06%  59.43%  0.31% 
iIn the 1990 Census, a migrant is defined as someone who has moved from other towns or townships and 
has lived in this place for more than one year but less than five years. 
ii Computed using average annual CPI for 1980-84 
iii Computed using income and average annual CPI for 1989 only   38
TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics for 1995-2000 period   
790 observations 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Migration rate x 100




Mean annual percentage of 
households with Hukou status 
during 1990-94 x 100 
90.38% 5.443%  96.01%  74.97% 
Past migration flows during 
1985-95 
2,498,500 6,854,100  89,320,000 10,000 
Real Mean Annual FDI Per 
Capita during 1990-94
ii  
$US 16.14 $US 24.25   $US 92.73  $US 0.58 
Real Mean Annual Fixed Asset 









Percentage of provincial FAI 
attributable to transportation 
infrastructure x 100 
5.48% 2.04%  11.07% 2.81% 
Real annual per capita income
iii   1,069 
Yuan 




Percentage of population 
enrolled in universities x 100  
0.3769% 0.3329%  1.7%  0.13% 
Unemployment rate x 100   4.40%  2.41%  9.64%  1.36% 
Manufacturing share of 
employment  x 100 
22.83% 9.82%  49.25%  9.17% 
Mean yearly temperature  14.113C  5.176C  24.517C  4.608C 
Urban share of population x 100   40.20%  18.56%  90.67%  18.63% 
Minority population share x 100  12.28%  16.06%  59.43%  0.31% 
iIn the 2000 Census, a migrant is defined as someone who has moved from other towns or townships and 
has lived in this place for more than one year but less than five years. 
ii Computed using average annual CPI for 1990-94 
iii Computed using income and average annual CPI for 1999 only 
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TABLE 3 
Summary Statistics for 2000-05 period   
790 observations 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Migration rate x 100




Mean annual percentage of 
households with Hukou status 
during 1995-99 x 100 
88.57% 6.726%  95.85%  67% 





$US 66.57   $US 
253.05 
$US 1.15 
Real Mean Annual Fixed Asset 











Percentage of provincial FAI 
attributable to transportation 
infrastructure x 100 
9.2% 3.06%  17.19%  3.98% 
Real annual per capita income








Percentage of population enrolled 
in universities  x 100 
0.9985% 0.5985%  3.06%  0.4% 
Unemployment rate x 100   3.14%  1.50%  7.17%  1.21% 
Manufacturing share of 
employment  x 100 
22.83% 9.82%  49.25%  9.17% 
Mean yearly temperature  14.27C  5.24C  25.1C  4.70C 
Urban share of population x 100   40.20%  18.56%  90.67%  18.63% 
Minority population share x 100  12.83%  16.47%  60.13%  0.31% 
iIn the 2005 Census, a migrant is defined as someone who has moved from other towns or townships and 
has lived in this place for more than one year but less than five years. 
ii Computed using average annual CPI for 1995-99 
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TABLE 4 
OLS Results for Full Sample (1985-90, 1995-2000 and 2000-05 migration periods) 
Dependent variable = log gross interprovincial migration rate 




I    II   III  IV  V 
Log (odds of 
obtaining Hukou 
in destination x 






A x early dummy      -23.89** 
(4.29) 
  
A x late dummy      -9.097** 
(2.629) 
  
Log (odds of 
migrant securing 
a job with Hukou 
x 100)  
(Measure B) 




B x early dummy          -9.848** 
(3.181) 
B x late dummy          -1.964** 
(1.092) 
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Log (ratio of 
destination to 
origin per capita 









Log (ratio of 
destination to 










Log FAI ratio x 











share of fixed 
asset investment 









Log (origin per 
capita GDP) x 














































0.5499 0.5558 0.5608  0.5551  0.557 
SSE  2476.5 2435.6 2406.5  2440.9  2429.6 
Sample  size  2,385 2,385 2,385  2,385  2,385 
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TABLE 5 
OLS Results for later two periods  
Dependent variable = log gross interprovincial migration rate 





I    II   III  IV  V  VI 
Log (odds of 
obtaining Hukou 






    




    
Log (odds of 
migrant securing 
job in destination 
with Hukou x 
100) (Measure B) 






B x middle 
dummy 






























Log distance x 



















































Log (1 – 
unemployment 
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Log (ratio of 
destination to 
origin real per 














Log (ratio of 
destination to 
origin real per 











Log FAI ratio x 
















share of fixed 
asset investment 











Log (origin per 
capita GDP) x 










































0.737  0.7591 0.7716 0.7593 0.7633  0.606 
SSE  910  813.84 785.11 828.62 814.26  1375 
Sample  size  1,580 1,580 1,580 1,580 1,580  1,580 
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TABLE 6 
Variation in Estimated Marginal Effect of Hukou across periods
1/  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses; ** denotes significant at 1%, * significant at 5%) 
 
 1985-90 
     (A) 
2000-05 
      (B) 
(A) – (B) 
Marginal effect 
relative to 1995-
2000 period of: 
   
Log (odds of 








Log (odds of a 
migrant securing 








1/Coefficients are taken from estimates of equations (III) and (V) in Table 4 
 
 